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Abstract In discussions on democratic legitimacy, Christiano’s position is often 
characterized as a monistic position, i.e. a strong and persuasive version of fair de-
liberative proceduralism. Democracy is thus seen as a realization of public equality 
in collective decision-making. The presented case for democracy is non-instrumen-
tal, and the quality of outcomes produced by a democratic decision-making pro-
cess does not constitute or in any way influence the legitimacy – generating fea-
tures of that decision-making process. I argue that the quality of political decisions 
produced by a democratic decision-making process should play an important 
(though not decisive) role in Christiano’s argument.
Consequently, I claim that his case for democracy should be (at least somewhat) 
instrumental. I consider four cases from Christiano’s The Constitution of Equality that 
show how outcomes of democratic procedures are very important to Christiano. 
Furthermore, I argue that these outcomes are so important that, when deciding 
between two or more fair decision-making procedures, one that produces the best 
outcomes should be considered legitimate.
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What makes a collective decision 
(i.e. a decision that affects and is binding 
on all members of a political communi-
ty) legitimate? We usually try to answer 
this question by referring to the certain 
qualities a decision has. Some claim that 
substantive qualities of a decision con-
stitute its legitimacy (Arneson 2003a, 
2003b, Wall 2007). According to this in-
strumentalist position, if a decision is 
true, correct or just (or represents a real-























is legitimate. Even more so, such a deci-
sion is legitimate because it is true, cor-
rect or just. A more compelling version 
of this position might introduce proce-
dure as a legitimizing element, but the 
procedure itself will be justified solely on 
its ability to produce true or just deci-
sions, or to bring about a desired end 
state (one that is perceived as good or 
just). Faced with conditions of reason-
able pluralism where people can, acting 
in good faith and employing their epis-
temic capabilities to the best of their 
abilities, reasonably hold different deci-
sions to be correct or just, and different 
end states to be good or desirable, many 
scholars have rejected the idea that the 
substantive qualities of a decision can 
constitute its legitimacy. They decided to 
focus on procedural (and not substan-
tive) qualities of the decision in question 
– we can say whether a decision is legiti-
mate or not by examining the process 
by which it was made (proceduralism). 
They do not evaluate a decision-making 
procedure by its ability to produce some 
desired (just or true) end state, but in-
stead by it being run in a certain desired 
(fair or epistemically favourable) state. It 
is no longer what the procedure will pro-
duce as an outcome, but how will this 
outcome be produced. Consequently, a 
substantively untrue, incorrect or unjust 
decision can be legitimate if it is pro-
duced by a legitimacy-generating deci-
sion-making process, one that focuses 
on the fairness (or some other intrinsic 
quality) of the procedure, and not on the 
substantive qualities of the outcomes it 
produces.
Many will see this move as a retreat 
from substance – by disregarding the 
substantive qualities of a collective deci-
sion, we neglect the outcomes of a politi-
cal process and focus only on its intrinsic 
value. According to pure proceduralism, 
there are no procedure-independent cri-
teria for evaluating the legitimacy of col-
lective decisions or the legitimacy-gen-
erating potential of procedures creating 
them. David Estlund rejected this idea 
by claiming that we can have a form of 
non-pure proceduralism that takes into 
consideration both the fairness of the 
procedure and the quality of the deci-
sions produced by a decision-making 
process when assessing its legitimacy-
generating potential. He named this po-
sition epistemic proceduralism (Estlund 
1997: 174), and distinguished it from 
other purely procedural (monistic) posi-
tions, including fair proceduralism and 
fair deliberative proceduralism1.
In discussions on democratic legiti-
macy, Christiano’s position is often char-
acterized as monistic one, i.e. a strong 
and persuasive version of fair delibera-
tive proceduralism (Estlund 1997, 2009, 
Peter 2005, 2010). Developing a very 
complex but nonetheless well-structured 
argument, Christiano finds both the au-
thority of democracy and its limits in the 
principle of public equality. This princi-
1 A further distinction between rational and 
pure epistemic proceduralism is introduced 
by Fabienne Peter. She calls Estlund’s posi-
tion Rational Epistemic Proceduralism, and 
describes it as a non-monistic position that 
relies on both the fairness of the procedure 
and the procedure-independent quality of 
outcomes when establishing political  legiti-
macy. Peter calls her own position Pure 
Epistemic Proceduralism – she claims that a 
procedure can have epistemic qualities that 
are not procedure-independent and out-
come-oriented (e.g. epistemic fairness), and 
that these qualities are sufficient for estab-
lishing procedure’s legitimacy-generating fea-
ture. Though this is a form of epistemic de-
mocracy, it is claimed to be purely proce-
dural (monistic) since no procedure-inde- 



































ple, together with demands of social 
justice, requires a collective decision- 
making process for the whole society, 
one in which each person has by right an 
equal say in the collective decision-mak-
ing (Christiano 2008). Democracy is 
thus seen as a realization of public equal-
ity in collective decision-making. The 
presented case for democracy is non-in-
strumental, and the quality of outcomes 
produced by a democratic decision- 
making process does not constitute or in 
any way influence the legitimacy-gener-
ating features of that decision-making 
process.
I have some doubts regarding the 
above mentioned characterization of 
Christiano’s position. Namely, I argue 
that the quality of political decisions 
produced by a democratic decision- 
making process should play an impor-
tant (though not decisive) role in Chris-
tiano’s argument. Consequently, it seems 
to me that his case for democracy should 
be (at least somewhat) instrumental. In 
order to elaborate this claim, in the first 
part of this paper I present some of the 
important parts of Christiano’s argu-
ment. I also relate the original text with 
notable interpretations by Estlund and 
Peter, pointing out the parts that indi-
cate that Christiano’s position is a form 
of fair deliberative proceduralism. In the 
second part, I consider four cases from 
Christiano’s The Constitution of Equali-
ty that show how outcomes of democrat-
ic procedures are very important to 
Christiano. Furthermore, I argue that 
these outcomes are so important that, 
when deciding between two or more fair 
decision-making procedures, the one 
that produces the best outcomes should 
be considered legitimate. This is closely 
related to Christiano’s idea of the funda-
mental value of well-being, as well as to 
the principle of public equality. I end by 
asking whether Christiano thinks that 
(representative deliberative) democracy 
can be instrumentally justified from the 
principle of public equality.
Christiano’s Argument for Democracy
Christiano offers very detailed argu-
mentation and any attempt to summa-
rize it unavoidably risks omitting some 
of the important parts of the argument. I 
will nonetheless try to summarize some 
key concepts relevant for the further dis-
cussion, emphasizing once more that 
many important ideas will unfortunately 
be omitted.
Christiano starts his argument by 
defining human beings as authorities in 
the realm of value, and well-being as a 
happy exercise of this distinctive author-
ity. We honor this authority by promot-
ing the well-being of human beings, and 
When assessing the legitimacy-generating 
potential of a procedure, we focus on:
State in which a 
decision-making 
procedure takes place
State that is the result  

































since every person represents an author-
ity in the realm of value, well-being is 
due each person. Christiano then intro-
duces two basic ideas about justice: the 
principle of propriety (each person 
should receive his or her due) and the 
generic principle of justice (relevantly 
alike cases should be treated alike, and 
relatively unalike cases unalike). Since 
human beings all have essentially the 
same basic capabilities to be authorities 
in the realm of value (there is no morally 
relevant difference), well-being should 
be distributed and promoted equally by 
the institutions of society (the principle 
of equality). Furthermore, since well-be-
ing should be cherished and promoted, 
we should favor those states of equality 
with more well-being, and even states of 
inequality where everyone’s well-being 
is promoted better than in some other 
state of equality (though this does not 
imply that such a state of inequality is 
just).
The principle of equality, further-
more, grounds the idea that equality 
should be publicly recognized by all hu-
man beings – everyone must be able to 
see that he or she is treated as equal. 
However, there are certain facts about 
citizens and society that make this very 
difficult. We have diverse interests and 
often cannot perceive or understand the 
interests of others, we are often cogni-
tively biased and more sensitive to our 
own interests than those of others, and 
finally, we even tend to interpret the idea 
or the demands of equality differently. 
We thus cannot agree whether some po-
litical decision substantively respects the 
demands of the principle of equality, i.e., 
whether it equally promotes the well-be-
ing of all persons. If someone still tries to 
impose the conception of equality that 
he believes to be the correct one, he or 
she will, because of the above mentioned 
facts about citizens and society, set back 
the interests and well-being of those 
who are imposed upon. From this Chris-
tiano concludes that it is impossible to 
achieve equality without equal partici-
pation of all citizens in a public deci-
sion-making process. Democracy is seen 
as an essential component of public real-
ization of equality (other essential com-
ponents are liberal rights and decent 
economic minimum), and is therefore 
intrinsically just. They are public realiza-
tion of equality because we can (despite 
the abovementioned facts about citizens 
and society) reach agreement on democ-
racy, liberal rights and decent economic 
minimum from the egalitarian stand-
point, and we cannot do the same for 
justice of the outcomes of the democrat-
ic decision-making or the goodness of 
the exercise of our liberal rights (Chris-
tiano 2008). We thus have public sub-
stantive reasons for accepting democra-


























































mum, and we have public procedural 
reasons for accepting the authority of a 
particular democratic decision and par-
ticular exercise of liberal rights. Since 
substantive reasons for democratic pro-
cedures do not regard some ideal end 
state (ideal equality cannot be a desired 
end state since we cannot agree upon 
what ideal equality is) or the quality of 
the outcomes of a decision-making pro-
cess (we cannot agree on the quality of 
the outcomes either), democracy is non- 
instrumentally justified.
This line of argumentation has led 
many scholars to interpret Christiano’s 
position as a form of Fair Deliberative 
Proceduralism. Estlund classifies Chris-
tiano’s position this way on more than 
one occasion (Estlund 1997: 200, 2009: 
244), sometimes referring to it as Pub-
licly Equal Proceduralism. Peter sup-
ports this classification, further stressing 
that, according to Christiano, the sub-
stantive, quality outcomes of political 
decisions do not play any role in legiti-
mizing the decision-making procedure 
or the decisions themselves.
According to Pure Deliberative Pro-
ceduralism, legitimacy is ensured as 
long as the demands of procedural 
fairness are satisfied. In analogy to 
Pure Aggregative Proceduralism, out-
comes do not matter for political le-
gitimacy under the regime of Pure 
Deliberative Proceduralism. All that 
matters for democratic legitimacy in 
such a regime is that collective deci-
sion-making proceeds through pub-
lic deliberation among all those af-
fected under conditions of political 
equality. This view is defended by 
Thomas Christiano [...] (Peter 2007: 
340-341)
Some scholars disagree with the pre-
sented classification: Marti argues that 
Christiano’s view is an easy case of a 
mixed position that combines intrinsic 
with instrumental values (Marti 2006: 
37), and Rostbøll points out that, by re-
lying on a kind of instrumentalism in 
democratic institutions, Christiano’s ar-
gument for democracy cannot avoid in-
voking procedure-independent epistem-
ic standards (Rostbøll 2015: 272-274). 
I fully agree with Marti and Rostbøll, 
and in the rest of the paper I provide 
further support for this interpretation of 
Christiano’s work. His position, I be-
lieve, should give at least some weight to 
the substantive quality of decisions pro-
duced by a collective decision-making 
process when discussing the legitimacy 
of political decisions and legitima-
cy-generating features of collective deci-
sion-making procedures.
Why should outcomes be important 
for Christiano’s position?
Though the importance of the quali-
ty of outcomes of political decisions can 
partly be assumed from the first parts of 
Christiano’s argument, it is later in the 
argument that we can more clearly see 
how outcomes can be important for the 
legitimacy of political decisions. In this 
part of the paper I discuss four separate 
cases taken from Christiano’s argument 
that, when properly understood, point 
out why the outcomes of a collective de-
cision-making procedure are important 
for its legitimacy-generating potential. 
Before that, however, we should focus on 
the reason why Christiano, in the first 
part of his argument, claims that democ-
racy is (solely) non-instrumentally justi-
fied, and consequently, why outcomes 
and end states should not play any role 
in its justification (Christiano 1996, 2008).
Democracy, as a public realization of 
equality, is intrinsically just. It is impor-























exclude that democracy can be instru-
mentally justified as well. Estlund’s view 
is a clear example of such a position; de-
mocracy is intrinsically justified because 
it is a fair procedure, and it is instrumen-
tally justified because of its epistemic 
qualities (to be more precise, its truth- 
tracking potential) (Estlund 2008). Chri-
stiano’s position rests to a great extent on 
the intrinsic justification of democracy 
– however, claiming that Christiano 
should include the instrumental justifi-
cation of democracy does not, in any 
way, undermine its intrinsic justifica-
tion.
Christiano is, however, not willing to 
include the instrumental qualities of de-
mocracy in its justification. Namely, by 
introducing instrumental qualities in 
the process of justification, the justifica-
tion will no longer be public because 
some of the reasonable citizens will not 
be able to recognize or approve these 
instrumental qualities. To say that a de-
cision-making procedure is instrumen-
tally justified implies that there is some 
intrinsically valuable end state that the 
use of this procedure helps bring about 
(Christiano 2008). Consequently, when 
we say that a decision-making proce-
dure is instrumentally justified, we are 
implying that we know what this intrin-
sically valuable end state (one that the 
procedures helps us achieve) is. Howev-
er, because of facts of judgment, we do 
not agree and cannot agree on what this 
intrinsically valuable end state is. The 
instrumental justification of democracy 
(one that rests on the certain end state 
that democracy helps achieve) cannot 
therefore be public since there is no pub-
lic agreement on such a valuable end 
state. Instrumentalist accounts of Rich-
ard Arneson and Steven Wall are what 
Christiano has in mind when he rejects 
the instrumental justification of democ-
racy. Both Arneson and Wall refer to 
some ideal egalitarian distribution as a 
desirable (intrinsically valuable) end 
state. The legitimacy-generating poten-
tial of decision-making procedures and 
the legitimacy of decisions made by 
them depend on how closely these deci-
sions approximate the ideal egalitarian 
distribution (Arneson 2003a, 2003b, 
Wall 2007). Since there is no public 
agreement on this ideal egalitarian dis-
tribution (not everyone can see that he 
or she is treated as equal), by imposing 
this conception of equality we will set 
back the interests and well-being of 
those who are imposed upon. We cannot 
have a public instrumental justification 
of democracy when we do not have a 
public agreement on the intrinsic value 
of the desired end state that democracy 
is supposed to achieve (Christiano 
2008).
I think Christiano is right when he 
rejects instrumentalist positions of Arne-
son and Wall. However, I claim that 
there can be public agreement on the 
value of some end states, and further-
more, that Christiano’s argument pre-
supposes this agreement at several im-
portant points. In the rest of this section 
I discuss four such examples.
a) Leveling-down objection
Equality is, as we have seen, very 
important for Christiano. This makes his 
position (as well as any other egalitarian 
position) is vulnerable to the famous 
leveling-down objection. This intuitive 
objection shows that principle of equali-
ty can have extremely implausible impli-
cations. The objection invites us to im-
agine two alternative states: S1 and S2. In 
S1, everyone is equally well-off, while in 
S2 everyone is better off than in S1, but 
some are better-off than others. Accord-


































that would favor S1 represents a depar-
ture from equality. It would, then, imply 
that we should make everyone worse-
off. Proponents of the leveling-down 
objection then conclude that there must 
be something wrong with the principle 
of equality.
S1 S2 S3
A 2 3 5
B 2 7 5
Furthermore, if we introduce the al-
ternative state S3, in which everyone is 
equally well-off, and everyone is bet-
ter-off than in S1, it might seem that the 
principle of equality should be indiffer-
ent towards S1 and S3. They both repre-
sent states of equal distribution of 
well-being, and from the standpoint of 
equality there is no relevant difference 
between them. Christiano disagrees 
with this conclusion, pointing out that 
egalitarians should prefer S3 to S1. He 
rightfully claims that there is internal 
connection between the rationale for 
equality and the value of a relevant fun-
damental good that is equalized. People 
are indifferent to the quantitative distri-
bution of letters in their names, mostly 
because a necessary condition for equal-
ity to matter is that it is better to have 
more than less of the thing being equal-
ized (Christiano 2008). The importance 
of well-being is thus built into the prin-
ciple of equality, and so egalitarians 
should differentiate between S1 and S3 
(i.e., egalitarians should favor S3). Chris-
tiano continues his argumentation by 
claiming that egalitarians must acknowl-
edge that S2 fails justice, though this 
does not imply that they should prefer 
S1 to S2. Namely, S1 also fails justice 
(even more than S2, though S1 is an state 
of equality) by failing to address the 
principle of well-being, an essential 
component of the principle of equality. 
Of course, S3 is superior to both S1 and 
S2, and if S3 is not feasible, then we must 
favor a state of inequality in which 
everyone is better-off than in the state of 
best feasible equality (Christiano 2008).
Though Christiano introduces very 
detailed and valuable argumentation for 
the discussions on equality, the key point 
for the purpose of this paper is that S3 is 
better than S1 (and this follows from the 
principle of equality). We can, at least at 
this abstract level, say that one state of 
affairs is better (or more just) than the 
other.
Consider now two alternative deci-
sion-making procedures: P1 and P3 are 
egalitarian procedures that give every 
person equal chance to participate in the 
decision-making process. They are both 
fair procedures, and it might even seem 
that they are both intrinsically justified 
as public realizations of equality (every-
one can see that he or she is treated as an 
equal). However, the well-being pro-
duced by P1 is considerably lesser than 
the well-being produced by P3. This can 
be for many reasons, but let us say that 
this is because P3 is better in organizing 
the existing virtues and good qualities of 
the people in a way that promotes their 
well-being.2 Since S3, the end state pro-
duced by P3, is better in improving the 
well-being of each citizen, it should be 
favored by the principle of well-being 
over S1 (produced by P1), and conse-
quently favored by the principle of 
equality. It seems that, considering the 
principle of equality, P3 should be fa-
vored over P1, though they are both fair 
and both give each citizen an equal 
chance to participate in the decision-
2 This is a variation of Mill’s second criteria 

























making process and influence the final 
decision. However, P1 and P3 have the 
same purely procedural qualities3 – what 
differentiates them is their ability to pro-
duce a state that improves the well-being 
of citizens, i.e., the difference between 
P1 and P3 is not in the procedural fair-
ness, but in the substantive quality of the 
outcomes they produce. It seems that the 
outcomes of political decisions should 
play a certain role in constituting the le-
gitimacy-generating potential of the 
procedures that have produced them, 
and it also seems that this claim is sup-
ported by the principle of equality.
3 This does not imply that all qualities the two 
procedures have are the same. If that were 
the case, it would not be possible to explain 
why the results they have produced are dif-
ferent. The two procedures have the same 
relevant purely procedural qualities (e.g. 
they give everyone an equal chance to par-
ticipate in the decision-making process). We 
refer to these qualities as purely procedural 
since they are intrinsically justified. The dif-
ference can be in other qualities (e.g. wheth-
er the procedure incorporates the division of 
labor, whether decisions are made by pre-
deliberation or post-deliberation voting), 
but these qualities are not intrinsically, but 
rather instrumentally justified. There is 
nothing ‘good in itself ’ in the division of la-
bor or public deliberation – these qualities 
are considered good because of the good 
outcomes they produce. The problem with 
fair proceduralism is that it must remain in-
different towards these qualities, since it at-
tributes legitimacy-generating potential only 
to intrinsically justified qualities. So the 
problem is that it focuses only on intrinsic 
qualities of a procedure (e.g. those in the 
square on the sketch below), and not on oth-
er relevant (instrumentally justified) quali-
ties of a procedure (e.g. those outside of the 
square on the sketch below). For fair proce-
duralists there is no relevant difference be-
tween procedures P1 and P3 because fair 
proceduralists characterize only certain in-
trinsic qualities as ‘relevant’. 
One way of answering this objection 
is claiming that S1 and S3 are very ab-
stract states: society is not divided in two 
well-distinguished groups and the well-
being of individuals is not possible to 
measure that easily. If we try to put these 
states in political practice, specifying 
them by various laws, policies and dis-
tributed resources, the idea that S3 is 
better than S1 would fail the publicity 
test. Because of the facts of judgment, 
not everyone would think of S3 as better 
in improving the well-being than S1, and 
referring to end states S1 and S3 could 
not be a public justification of P1 or P3. 
Christiano’s answer to leveling-down 
objection should then be seen as a theo-
retical project without any direct conse-
quences on real-life laws and policies.4 
4 Though I agree that, because of facts of judg-
ment, we cannot have public agreement on 
some important moral issues and issues re-
garding our well-being, I believe there can 
be important difference between S1 and S3 
that everyone should (despite facts of judg-
ment) be able to perceive. In order to elabo-
rate this difference, we can use results gath-
ered by Democracy Ranking Association 
which produces an annual global ranking of 
democracies. According to the ranking, de-
mocracy consists of six dimensions (one po-
litical, five non-political), with different 
weights for the overall quality of democracy. 
Their weights are distributed accordingly: 
politics (or the political system) 50%; gender 
(gender equality in socioeconomic and edu-
cational terms) 10%; economy (or the eco-
nomic system) 10%; knowledge (knowledge 
society, research and education) 10%; health 
(or the health system and health status) 
10%; and environment (environmental sus-
tainability) 10% (Campbell and Sükösd, 
2002). The first dimension (politics) focuses 
on procedural fairness of a democratic sys-
tem (whether everyone has a right to partic-
ipate in decision-making process, whether 
there are discriminated individuals or 
groups of people), while other five focus on 



































It seems to me, however, that that would 
not be a correct interpretation. When 
Christiano discusses the quality of deci-
sions produced by equal lotteries or 
coin-flipping, or when he argues in favor 
of deliberative and representative de-
mocracy, he seems to be endorsing the 
idea that these practices are somehow 
better in increasing the well-being of 
citizens, and this seems to follow from 
the public principle of equality. Let us 
then discuss the remaining three cases 
to support this claim.
b) Christiano rejects equal lotteries
If procedural fairness is the only cri-
terion for the legitimacy-generating po-
tential of a decision-making procedure 
(i.e. if the only relevant state is one in 
which a decision-making process takes 
place, and not the one that is an outcome 
of such a decision-making process), 
there is more than one procedure that 
can satisfy it. Coin-flipping can be one 
such procedure: if we flip a coin every 
time we have to make a political deci-
sion, we seem to be using a fair decision-
making procedure, since everyone has 
an equal chance to influence the final 
(these results, like economcy, knowledge, 
health and enviroment, are very important 
for the well-being of persons). We can imag-
ine situations when two countries have the 
same score for politics, but differ signitifant-
ly regarding other five dimensions. This is 
exactly the situation with S1 and S3: they 
both respect procedural fairness and give 
every citizen equal chance to participate in 
decision-making, but the results that affect 
the well-being of people (economy, health, 
education, enviroment) are different because 
of some other qualities of decision-making 
procedures (e.g. whether they implement di-
vison of labor and encourage public deliber-
ation). I believe Christiano acknowledges 
this when he discusses and rejects direct and 
aggregative democracy.
decision, i.e., no chance at all (Nelson 
1980, Estlund 2008). We can also ran-
domly select one person who will make 
a political decision that will be binding 
on all of us, or we can have a voting sys-
tem where a single vote is randomly se-
lected to be decisive. In all of these cases, 
everyone has an equal chance to influ-
ence the final decision (an equal chance 
to be selected as a ‘queen for a day,’ or an 
equal chance that his or her vote will be 
selected as decisive) (Estlund 2008). It 
seems that all these procedures stand in 
accordance with the principle of public 
equality; everyone is treated as an equal, 
and everyone can see and accept that.
Democracy is a fair decision-making 
procedure as well – but why should we 
favor democracy over coin-flipping, 
queen for a day or equal lotteries? Chris-
tiano is convinced there is a relevant dif-
ference between these procedures: fair, 
but non-democratic decision-making 
procedures represent a very thin form of 
equality that does not go beyond initial 
distribution. They all fail to realize 
equality adequately (Christiano 2008). 
Christiano introduces an analogous case 
of substituting equal distribution of 
chance for material resources for equal 
distribution of resources (Christiano 
2008: 108-112). This is a very useful 
analogy that points out that, when we 
can publicly determine what an equal 
distribution is (as we can with wages), 
results and end states are very impor-
tant. Furthermore, the principle of pub-
lic equality directs us to use a distribut-
ing mechanism that will produce a de-
sired outcome or end state, and it directs 
us to use a decision-making procedure 
that will produce the same desired out-
come or end state. Democracy will be 
better in achieving this desired end state 
(equality of well-being) than equal lot-
























distribution of resources will be better in 
achieving the same end state than equal 
chance for material resources. In de-
mocracy, Christiano claims, equality 
does reach beyond initial distribution 
because people have capacities to nego-
tiate, deliberate and exchange political 
power, ‘and these are activities that are 
highly advantageous to all the partici-
pants’ (Christiano 2008: 110). The main 
problem with lotteries is that they do not 
enable us to engage in deliberation, ne-
gotiation and exchange, i.e., in activities 
that help us improve our interests and 
our well-being. One could argue that 
deliberation, negotiation and exchange 
are advantageous from the standpoint of 
procedural equality (Peter 2011, Gut-
mann and Thompson 1996, 2000), but 
Christiano rejects this idea, first when he 
rejects tradable equal chances at wages 
(Christiano 2008: 109), and then when 
he argues that public deliberation is in-
strumentally justified (Christiano 2008: 
192). Finally, Christiano admits the im-
portance of outcomes when he rejects 
equal lotteries:
In an egalitarian system of decision-
making one would want the agent a for 
decision-making to be determined in an 
egalitarian way as well since this is cru-
cial to the outcome of decision-making. 
(Christiano 2008: 111, [emphasis added])
It seems that argument against equal 
lotteries and other fair but non-demo-
cratic decision making procedures is (at 
least partly) outcome based – even if 
they give every person equal chance to 
influence the final decision, they do not 
produce outcomes as good as democracy.
c) Christiano rejects direct democracy
As we have seen in the earlier case, 
Christiano rejects coin-flipping, equal 
lotteries and other fair but non-demo-
cratic decision-making procedures. He 
claims that democracy is the only ade-
quate public realization of equality. 
However, democracy is not a single, 
precisely defined decision-making pro-
cedure; there are many forms of democ-
racy and many different decision-mak-
ing procedures can be referred to as 
democratic. Is there (and can there be) 
any relevant difference between these 
democratic decision-making procedu-
res? How are we to decide which demo-
cratic decision-making procedure is the 
one that creates legitimate decisions?
Christiano accepts a form of repre-
sentative democracy, and argues that di-
rect democracy should be rejected on 
the grounds of the principle of equality. 
Some might find this very problematic. 
If equality is the basis for democracy, 
then a more equal, but far less effective 
system of collective decision-making 
would be superior to an unequal system 
that was more effective at advancing ev-
eryone’s interests. Christiano indirectly 
accepts the idea that direct democracy is 
more equal than representative democ-
racy, but argues that the latter should be 
accepted because of its efficiency (Chris-
tiano 2008: 104-105). This efficiency is 
the product of the division of (epistemic) 
labor in modern states – citizens are thus 
to define the aims the society is to pur-
sue, while legislators (political represen-
tatives and experts) are charged with the 
task of implementing and devising the 
means for those aims through legisla-
tion. Of course, the requirement of 
 political equality is met if (and only if) 
the legislative assembly proportionately 
represents the aims citizens have chosen.
Even if there is some inequality un-
der representative democracy (and more 
inequality than in direct democracy), it 
is still preferable on the principle of 



































representative democracy will constitute 
a Pareto improvement over direct de-
mocracy. Consequently, representative 
democracy would be more just even if 
direct democracy would be more equal. 
The advantages of the division of labor 
are so clear that this can qualify as a pub-
licly clear improvement (Christiano 2008: 
105).
When we evaluate the legitimacy-
generating potential of representative 
and direct democracy, Christiano claims 
that we should, at least partly, focus on 
their ability to increase the well-being of 
citizens (this follows from the principle 
of well-being, and consequently from 
the principle of equality). And this im-
plies that we should focus on procedure’s 
ability to produce certain desirable out-
comes and end states, and it is this ability 
that (at least to a certain degree) gives a 
decision-making procedure legitimacy-
generating qualities. Representative de-
mocracy is thus (at least partly) instru-
mentally justified – it is better than di-
rect democracy because of its ability to 
produce a certain, intrinsically valuable 
end state5.
5 This paper tries to demonstrate why Chris-
tiano should accept the idea that, from the 
standpoint of equality, democracy is at least 
partly instrumentally justified. As I have 
noted earlier, I do not want to claim that de-
mocracy is solely instrumentally justified. 
However, Christiano’s preference towards ef-
ficiency in improving the well-being of citi-
zens can even lead some to argue that his 
view is actually an instrumentalist position. 
If the procedure’s ability to produce a desir-
able end state is more important than its 
purely procedural fairness (its ability to treat 
everyone as an equal and give everyone an 
equal chance to influence the final decision), 
then Christiano can give a procedure this 
legitimacy-generating potential solely on the 
basis of its ability to produce good out-
comes. This might be a view very similar to 
d)  Christiano rejects aggregative  
 democracy
In the previous case we have seen 
that, according to Christiano, represen-
tative democracy can be publicly justi-
fied and preferred from the standpoint 
of equality over direct democracy. How-
ever, we are faced with the same problem 
once again: there are various forms of 
representative democracy and, though 
we have narrowed the list of legitimacy-
generating democratic procedures, we 
still have to choose one among different 
alternatives. It seems that the interests of 
every person can be publicly treated 
equally in both aggregative and delibera-
tive democracy. Do then both the aggre-
gative and deliberative model, as long as 
they are both representative and demo-
cratic, produce legitimate decisions?
Christiano disagrees – though it 
might seem that both procedures pub-
licly treat everyone’s interests equally, 
J. S. Mill’s instrumentalist position – a form 
of government is justified only on the basis 
of its ability to improve the well-being of 
citizens, and democracy (or scholocracy) is 
thus better than monarchy (or epistocracy) 
because it is better in detecting and satisfy-
ing interests and the well-being of the peo-
ple (it is partly better in satisfying the inter-
ests of people because it improves moral and 
intellectual capabilities of people, but this 
improvement is again instrumentally justi-
fied because it helps us to produce better de-
cisions and better improve our well-being). 
There is no doubt, however, that democracy 
is instrumentally justified. Furthermore, 
Mill also introduces the publicity require-
ment, especially when suggesting the plural 
voting proposal (Mill 1977). I do not want to 
press this analogy further in this paper, 
though I believe that it could be expanded 
and might even lead us to conclude that 
Christiano is suggesting an instrumentalist 
position, something very different from fair 
deliberative proceduralism, as his position 
























there are strong reasons for rejecting ag-
gregative democracy. However, Chris-
tiano explicitly argues that these reasons 
are instrumental (Christiano 2008: 190-
197). Deliberation is instrumentally jus-
tified because it improves the under-
standing of the interests of the members 
of the community, it enables us to root 
out policies based on prejudices and it 
enhances certain desirable qualities in 
citizens (e.g. autonomy, morality and 
rationality). Furthermore, it helps us to 
promote some of our fundamental inter-
ests (e.g. correcting for cognitive biases 
in others and acquiring true and justi-
fied beliefs) that are used in the justifica-
tion of democracy. This implies that we 
cannot consider these cases separately 
and argue that democracy is solely, in-
trinsically justified, and that deliberation 
solely, instrumentally, justified (as far as 
I can see, this is exactly what Christiano 
does) (Christiano 2008: 71, 193), since 
the same argument is used to justify 
both of them, and deep down it is an in-
strumental argument (correcting for 
cognitive biases in others and acquiring 
true and justified beliefs are not, as far as 
I understand Christiano’s argument, 
self- standing epistemic virtues,6 but in-
stead good means to achieve a desired 
end state, one with greatest level of well-
being for everyone).
Let us then summarize the second 
part of this paper. Christiano argues that 
democracy is solely, intrinsically justi-
fied since it is a public realization of 
equality, and argues that it cannot be in-
6 Fabiene Peter would probably argue some-
thing like this. She calls her position Pure 
Epistemic Proceduralism since she justifies 
deliberative democracy on the basis of its 
self-standing (purely procedural) epistemic 
values, and not on the basis of consequen-
tialist epistemology (like Estlund and Chris-
tiano). (Peter 2011)
strumentally justified since that would 
include calling some end state intrinsi-
cally valuable, and we cannot have a 
public agreement on how should that 
end state look like (Christiano 2008: 71 
– 74). He defends representative delib-
erative democracy and claims it is, from 
the standpoint of equality, superior to 
other fair decision-making procedures, 
including coin-flipping, queen for a day, 
equal lotteries, direct democracy and ag-
gregative democracy. Representative, 
deliberative democracy is superior be-
cause of its ability to produce desirable 
outcomes and end states, those with 
more well-being for everyone. Further-
more, Christiano claims that this follows 
from the principle of public equality, 
since everyone can see not only that he 
or she is being treated as an equal, but 
also that representative deliberative de-
mocracy will be better in producing the 
desired end state (more well-being for 
everyone) than other fair decision-mak-
ing procedures. This is clearly a form of 
instrumental justification. It seems that, 
from the egalitarian standpoint and the 
principle of public equality, democracy 
is (at least partly) instrumentally justi-
fied. Consequently, democratic deci-
sions are legitimate because of democ-
racy’s legitimacy-generating qualities, 
and these qualities include both its pro-
cedural fairness and its ability to pro-
duce good outcomes (to best improve 
the well-being of all citizens).
Conclusion
This paper tries to show that Chris-
tiano’s view should not be regarded as a 
monistic position in discussions on po-
litical legitimacy. Though many have 
described his position as a form of pure 
(fair) deliberative proceduralism, and 
though Christiano himself emphasizes 



































making procedures should not play any 
role in constituting their legitimacy-
generating potential, it seems to me that 
a form of non-monism follows from 
principle of public equality. Namely, the 
principle of well-being (which is an im-
portant element of the principle of pub-
lic equality) asks us to evaluate the ability 
of decision-making procedures to im-
prove the well-being of human beings. If 
there is more than one procedure that 
treats everyone as an equal, we should 
differentiate between them on the basis 
of their ability to improve our well-be-
ing, as well as the well-being of other 
human beings. I believe this is why 
Christiano rejects coin-flipping, equal 
lotteries, direct and aggregative democ-
racy (though they are all fair decision-
making procedures) in favor of repre-
sentative deliberative democracy. The 
quality of the outcomes (or end states) of 
political decisions thus seems to play an 
important role in constructing the legit-
imacy-generating potential of a deci-
sion-making procedure, and this seems 
to follow from the principle of public 
equality. I would like to hear more about 
why Christiano thinks that democratic 
legitimacy can be established only on 
the basis of its intrinsic qualities, and 
what is then the role of the quality of 
outcomes (or end states) according to 
his position?
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Kako načelo javne jednakosti uvodi sadržaj  
u demokratski proceduralizam
SAŽETAK U raspravama o demokratskoj legitimnosti, Christianova se pozicija često shvaća 
monistički, kao jaka i uvjerljiva verzija pravičnog deliberativnog proceduralizma. Demo-
kracija je tako shvaćena kao realizacija javne jednakosti u kolektivnom procesu odlučiva-
nja. Njegova pozicija je neinstrumentalna, te kvaliteta odluka koje procedura donošenja 
odluka proizvodi ni na koji način ne utiječe na njezinu legitimnost. U ovom radu tvrdim 
kako bi kvaliteta demokratskih odluka trebala biti bitan (iako ne odlučujuć) dio Christia-
nove argumentacije. Posljedično, tvrdim da bi njegovo opravdanje demokracije trebalo 
biti (barem djelomično) instrumentalno. Razmatram četiri slučaja iz njegove knjige The 
Constitution of Equality kako bih pokazao da su ishodi demokratskih procedura zapravo 
veoma bitni za Christiana. Štoviše, tvrdim da su ishodi toliko bitni da bi, kada odlučujemo 
između dvije ili više pravičnih procedura odlučivanja, procedura koja proizvodi najbolje 
ishode trebala biti smatrana legitimnom.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI deliberativna demokracija, Thomas Christiano, proceduralizam, legitim-
nost
